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Abstract
Background: Compared with its surging foreign trade, China’s domestic trade
growth from 2000 to 2010 had been less encouraging. Then, what are the driving
forces behind the dynamic pattern of China’s domestic trade?
Methods: Using the gravity model of trade and China’s interprovincial panel data, this
paper shows that the negative effect of distance-related transactions costs on
interprovincial trade tends to rise from 2000 to 2010. After constructing China’s 56 ethnic
groups into a single, interprovincial similarity index, I cannot find any evidence that
supports the view that ethnic links should serve as a factor promoting bilateral trade.
Results: However, my estimated coefficients on 37major ethnic groups show that both
positive and negative ethnic influences on trade exist in China. Specifically, 14 ethnic groups
(Lahu, Qiang, Jingpo, Tu, Mongol, Manchu, Hui, Zhuang, Dongxiang, Daur, Kirgiz, She,
Maonan, and Tibetan) are found to contribute to China’s interprovincial trade, while five
ethnic groups (Han, Va, Kazak, Dai, and Blang) tend to impede China’s interprovincial trade.
Conclusions: These findingswill be useful for policy-makers to reappraise which of China’s
ethnic groups are playing themost (least) important roles in, and to introduce the optimal
informal institutions into, the promotion of interprovincial economic cooperation in China.
Keywords:Domestic trade, Spatial (dis)integration, Interprovincial ethnic linkage, Province,
China
Background
The first decade of the twenty-first century was unusual to China. Promoted by its
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001, China’s eco-
nomic growth has significantly driven by its remarkable performance in foreign trade.
WTO data shows that China’s exports and imports enjoyed the average annual growth
rates of 18 % and 16 % from 2000 to 2010, respectively, much higher than the average
annual growth rate of the global trade volume in the same period, which was only
3 %.1 In 2000, for example, China was the seventh leading exporter and eighth largest
importer of merchandise trade. Since 2001, China has steadily increased its share of
global manufactured exports. Notwithstanding the global reductions in trade, which
resulted from the US financial crisis in 2008, China replaced Germany as the world’s lar-
gest exporting nation in 2009. In 2010, China continued to be the leading merchandise
exporter (US$1.58 trillion, or 10.4 % of world exports), followed by the USA (8.4 % of
world exports), Germany (8.3 % of world exports), and Japan (5.1 % of world exports).2
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When looking inside China, however, one can only find less encouraging news. For ex-
ample, compared with its surging foreign trade as mentioned above, which has increased
by more than four (for exports) or three (for imports) times from 2000 to 2010, China’s do-
mestic trade has only achieved a growth of 86.26 % during the same period (see Table 1).
This means that China’s domestic trade—both intra-provincial and interprovincial—has
only had an average annual growth rate of about 6 % from 2000 to 2010. Frankly speaking,
this may not have been treated as a low figure in many other countries during that period
of time. However, compared with its 16–18 % of annual foreign trade growth rate and 10 %
Table 1 Changes of China’s domestic and interprovincial trade from 2000 to 2010
Provincial
economy
Domestic trade (thousand tons) Ratio of interprovincial trade (%)
2000 2010 Change (%) 2000 2010 Change (%)
Anhui 6087 12,092 98.65 56.84 47.93 −8.91
Beijing 2612 1571 −39.85 72.21 95.23 23.02
Chongqing 1613 2197 36.21 56.79 65.95 9.16
Fujian 2475 3704 49.66 46.22 53.48 7.26
Gansu 3236 6186 91.16 52.10 61.27 9.17
Guangdong 4521 7505 66.00 74.70 79.72 5.02
Guangxi 2815 6109 117.02 67.10 75.82 8.72
Guizhou 3585 7991 122.90 69.29 82.98 13.69
Hainan 311 542 74.28 NA 10.89 NA
Hebei 11,399 16,481 44.58 60.61 56.09 −4.52
Heilongjiang 12,701 16,888 32.97 54.47 49.19 −5.28
Henan 9655 13,374 38.52 78.92 71.53 −7.39
Hubei 3937 5698 44.73 62.81 66.57 3.75
Hunan 4668 5783 23.89 65.62 61.27 −4.35
Inner Mongolia 9171 37,698 311.06 69.55 77.00 7.46
Jiangsu 4076 6372 56.33 63.67 85.75 22.08
Jiangxi 2959 5376 81.68 57.92 51.95 −5.97
Jilin 5630 7674 36.31 60.55 69.53 8.98
Liaoning 12,520 18,118 44.71 34.03 29.94 −4.09
Ningxia 1782 4414 147.70 73.12 86.45 13.33
Qinghai 647 3096 378.52 81.14 61.66 −19.48
Shaanxi 3280 8836 169.39 65.95 69.09 3.15
Shandong 10,585 18,285 72.74 52.24 62.67 10.43
Shanghai 1054 959 −9.01 89.56 93.53 3.97
Shanxi 28,469 60,812 113.61 91.96 92.76 0.80
Sichuan 5516 7389 33.96 46.79 51.59 4.80
Tianjin 2004 7240 261.28 81.64 54.46 −27.18
Tibet 30 NA 100.00 NA
Xinjiang 3353 6775 102.06 73.67 74.05 0.39
Yunnan 2882 5209 80.74 59.51 67.92 8.41
Zhejiang 1929 3806 97.30 62.10 41.59 −20.51
All 165,472 308,210 86.26 65.53 69.06 5.39
(1) “Trade” only includes freight exchange via national railways. (2) NA = data are not available
Source: calculated by the author based on China Association of Communications and Transportation and the National
Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China (2001, 2011)
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of annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate from 2000 to 2010, China’s domestic
trade performance can only but be labeled as “poor”.
Even worse news comes from China’s interprovincial trade performance. China’s official
statistics on interprovincial trade (in terms of freight exchange via national railways) are
puzzling. For example, except for China’s two peripheral territories (i.e., Hainan and
Tibet) whose data are not available in 2000, the proportions of interprovincial trade to the
total domestic trade have risen in only 17 provincial economies (i.e., Beijing, Jiangsu, Gui-
zhou, Ningxia, Shandong, Gansu, Chongqing, Jilin, Guangxi, Yunnan, Inner Mongolia,
Fujian, Guangdong, Sichuan, Shanghai, Hubei, and Shaanxi) from 2000 to 2010. By way of
contrast, the proportions for the remaining provincial economies have either decreased
(i.e., in Tianjin, Zhejiang, Qinghai, Anhui, Henan, Jiangxi, Heilongjiang, Hebei, Hunan,
and Liaoning) or been kept almost unchanged (i.e., in Shanxi and Xinjiang) during the
same period (see Table 1 for more details).3
Indeed, the above phenomenon is unusual, especially after the following facts are
taken into account:
(i) Since the 1990s, there has been a significant improvement of transport
infrastructures (including, inter alia, the completion of various expressways
and high-speed railways across the nation) in China
(ii)Since 1999, the “Western Regional Development Policy” has been implemented
by the Chinese central government in order to speed up the development of the
western and central provinces by encouraging the economic cooperation between
the East-West provinces
(iii)Since 2008, and as a result of the global reductions in trade, which resulted from
the US financial crisis, the Chinese government has made various efforts in order
to stimulate China’s domestic consumption
Then, what are the driving forces behind the dynamic patterns of China’s domestic
trade and how to explain its interprovincial trade puzzle?
Methods
Literature review
Past studies of the determinants of spatial economic interdependence seem controversial,
or at least incomplete. According to the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem, if the two factors of
production are capital and labor, countries with dissimilar levels of per capita income (or,
more precisely, dissimilar capital/labor ratios) will trade more than countries with similar
levels (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933). However, a number of empirical results indicate that
the inclusion of income level as a determinant of trade contradicts the assumptions of
traditional Heckscher–Ohlin theory (e.g., Linder 1961; Deardorff 1998, p. 15). In order to
fill up this gap, economists have put forward new theories that base international trade
on, among others, economies of scale, market imperfections, and cross-national differ-
ences in technology (e.g., Markusen 1986; Helpman 1987; Krugman 1995).
However, past studies have raised more questions than they have answered. For ex-
ample, the effects of geographical proximity on trade have not been shown to fall over
time. Rather, these effects have been shown to strengthen over time for 1950–1988
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(Boisso and Ferrantino 1997) and 1965–1992 (Frankel et al. 1997a). Similarly, Rauch
(1999) provides no evidence that, as a result of technological innovation, declining
distance-related transactions costs should have led to increased trade flows. One possi-
bility is that these analyses exclude important explanatory variables, thereby biasing the
estimates.4 To clarify related issues, it is necessary to isolate the influences of all
distance-related variables on trade. In particular, the inclusion of some relevant cultural
variables might allow us to gain a better understanding of the black box containing the
distance-related transactions costs that affect spatial economic activities.
China has officially identified, except other unknown ethnic groups and foreigners
with Chinese citizenship, 56 ethnic groups. Although the majority of China’s population
is of the Han nationality (which accounts for more than 90 % of China’s total popula-
tion), the non-Han ethnic groups have a population of more than 100 million. Thanks
to the easing migration policy that has been implemented since the 1980s, China’s
interprovincial labor flows have increased dramatically. It is noteworthy that these flows
have also been conducted by people coming from the inland, ethnic-minority, areas
and moving into the coastal, Han-majority areas. Consequently, China’s interprovincial
ethnic networks have been enhanced. As of 2010 when the Sixth National Population
Census of the People’s Republic of China was conducted, each of China’s 31 provinces
has become home to almost all ethnic groups. How have these growing ethnic net-
works contributed to (or impeded) China’s interprovincial economic cooperation and
integration?
There is a widely held view that easily observable impediments, such as transporta-
tion costs, do not adequately capture transactions costs in international trade. Trade is
also reduced by hidden transaction costs associated with unobserved trade barriers.5 In
addition, some studies use international panel data and find that cultural distance or
dissimilarity—as proxied by, among other things, the ethnic/linguistic and religious dif-
ferences across national populations—is a robust determinant of the volume of inter-
national trade (see, for example, Rauch and Trindade 2002; Noland 2005; Guiso et al.
2006; and Guo 2009, pp. 77–102).
Since the 1990s, numerous quantitative studies have examined the role that cultural
factors play in international trade (e.g., Havrylyshyn and Pritchett 1991; Foroutan and
Pritchett 1993; Frankel and Wei 1995; Frankel et al. 1997a; Rauch 1999; Guo 2007;
Melitz 2008; Felbermayr et al. 2010). These studies used linguistic or/and religious links
as one or more explanatory variables. The estimated results suggest that countries
which are similar to one another have been more likely to trade with each other in the
postwar period. In other words, there is evidence of cultural barriers to trade.
Indeed, trade and economic cooperation may be affected by cultural dissimilarities,
as it is easier and more efficient for people with the same cultural identity (ethnicity,
language, religion, or any other cultural elements) to trust and communicate each other
than for those with different cultural identities. In this paper, our particular interest is
to test how ethnic differences have influenced China’s interprovincial trade and eco-
nomic cooperation. Even though language is an effective tool of communication and
that religion can provide insights into the characteristics of a culture, we would rather
select ethnicity as the explanatory variable. The rationale is that most, if not all, of
China’s ethnic groups are identified in terms of either linguistic or religious traditions.
Another reason lies in the fact that, in China, it is more difficult, if not impossible, to
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collect interprovincial panel data on linguistic and religious groups than those on
ethnic groups.
The gravity model is most commonly used by international and regional economists
to study trade. The classic early application of the model was by Linnemann (1966),
who continued work first reported in Tinbergen (1962) and then in Pöyhönen (1963).6
Generally, a gravity model assumes that the volume of trade between any two econ-
omies will be directly proportional to the product of their economic masses (measured
by GDP or GNP) and inversely proportional to the distance between them. Per capita
incomes (measured by product of per capita GDPs or GNPs) have become a standard
covariate in the gravity models of, for example, Eaton and Tamura (1994); Frankel et al.
(1997a, b) and Rauch (1999).
The model
In this paper, our particular interest is to test how various ethnic groups have influ-
enced China’s interprovincial trade and economic cooperation. Recent gravity equa-
tions, compared to the earlier ones, have included multilateral trade resistance (MTR)
terms (e.g., Feenstra 2004; Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Head and Mayer 2013). The
MTR terms arise because in a general equilibrium model, trade flows between any two
provinces not only depend on trade costs between the two provinces under consider-
ation, but also on trade costs between all other trading pairs. However, in this paper,
we intend to simplify the MTR terms. The rationale is that China’s domestic MTR
terms, if they do exist, are much weaker than the international ones. To this end, we
only add country-fixed effects to the gravity models. As noted by Adam and Cobham
(2007), these effects can be thought of theoretically as approximations to MTR terms.
The basic form of the gravity model to be used in our empirical analysis of interprovin-
cial trade is as the following7:
ln TRADEij
  ¼ α0 þ α1 ln GDPiGDPj
 þ α2lnDISTANCEij þ α3ADJACENTij
þ α4 ln GDPPCiGDPPCj
 þ α5PD þ βETHNIC56ij
ð1Þ
In Eq. (1), “ln” represents the natural logarithm; TRADEij, measured in thousand
tons, is the total freight exchange between provinces i and j. GDPiGDPj is the product
of GDP (in Chinese currency) of the ith and jth provinces. DISTANCEij represents the
distance between the geographical centers of gravity of the ith and jth provinces (in
kilometers).8 ADJACENTij is a dummy variable, which takes the values of “1” for prov-
inces i and j to have a common border and of “0” otherwise. GDPPCiGDPPCj is the
product of GDP per capita (in Chinese currency) of the ith and jth provinces. PD
denotes a province dummy, which takes the values of “1” for provinces to be either a
mountain-dominated or an island province (Chongqing, Guizhou, Hainan, Qinghai,
Sichuan, Tibet, or Yunnan—we include these provinces since they have China’s most
complicated geographical conditions and therefore have the most difficulties in trans-
portation) and of “0” otherwise.
ETHNIC56ij represents the extent to which the ith and jth provinces are ethnically
linked each other (details about the measurement will be discussed in Eq. (6) in “The
data” sub-section). Note that since ETHNIC56 is a comprehensive index for all of China’s
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56 ethnic groups, it can only be used to derive a general pattern of correlation between
interprovincial trade and ethnic linkage. If one wants to examine the role that each ethnic
group plays, the gravity model can be now written as the following:
ln TRADEij
  ¼ α0 þ α1 ln GDPiGDPj
 þ α2lnDISTANCEij þ α3ADJACENTij
þ α4 ln GDPPCiGDPPCj




In Eq. (2), ETHNICijk represents the extent to which the kth ethnic group is linked
between the ith and jth provinces (details about the measurement will be discussed in
Eq. (5) in “The data” section). Only 37 ethnic groups—each with a population of less
than 100,000 persons (see Appendix for more detailed information)—are included in
this equation.
Theoretically, cultural dissimilarity can result in both social transactions costs (a fac-
tor directly impeding trade) and “economic complementarity” (an important factor dir-
ectly facilitating trade) simultaneously. As a result, the relationship between trade and
cultural similarity may follow a non-linear pattern (Guo 2004, 2009, pp. 96–101). Our
interest now goes to the clarification of specific cultural groups which may have differ-
ent types of influences on trade with provinces differing in income levels. To go further,
this paper employ a new explanatory variable: ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj)ETHNIC56ij. Conse-
quently, a modified form of gravity model is written as:
ln TRADEij
  ¼ α0 þ α1 ln GDPiGDPj
 þ α2lnDISTANCEij þ α3ADJACENTij
þ α4 ln GDPPCiGDPPCj
 




In Eq. (3), the ethnicity variable is now entered into the gravity model linearly
and also as a product with the natural log of per capita GDPs. Thus, the effect of
an ethnic group on interprovincial trade is now allowed to exist separately and to
depend on the income levels of trading partners, measured by the natural log of
their per capita GDPs. As a matter of fact, since ETHNIC56ij can be written as
Ethnicij1 + Ethnicij2 +… + Ethnicijk +… + Ethnicij56, the non-linear effects of some, if
not all ethnic variables on interprovincial trade may be derived from Eq. (3).
Specifically, as for the kth ethnic group (k = 1, 2, …, 37), if the estimated coefficients
on Ethnicijk (that is, βk) and on ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj)ETHNIC56ij (that is, α4) have dif-
ferent signs (such as α4 < 0 and βk > 0; or α4 > 0 and βk < 0) and are statistically signifi-
cant in Eq. (3), one obtains a threshold value (ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj)
*
k) by letting the first-
order differential of the dependent variable (ln(TRADEij) with respect to Ethnicijk be
zero, which is:





As for the case of α4 < 0 and βk > 0:
(i) If ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj)k is smaller than ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj)
*
k, the kth ethnic group
has a positive effect on the trade between the ith and jth provinces
(ii)If ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj)k is larger than ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj)
*
k, the kth ethnic group
has a negative effect on the trade between the ith and jth provinces.
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The data
The major task of this paper is to quantitatively investigate the sources for changes
in China’s spatial economic integration over time. Thus, the use of the cross-
sectional data from China’ s provincial economies in different years enables that
the estimated results are not artifact of any particular time period and to allow for
changes in coefficients. Generally, a decade-long period is appropriate for this kind
of research because analysis for a shorter period would not reflect relevant social
and economic changes, while significant changes in transportation and communica-
tion technologies would have to be accounted for if a longer one is used. Of
course, a longer period is still more helpful if three or more sets of cross-sectional
data are available. However, this would increase inevitably the costs in data collec-
tion. In this paper, after taking into account data availability, we select
2 years—2000 and 2010.
The data on interprovincial trade are cited from China Communications Year-
books (2000 and 2010).9 China’s 2000 and 2010 provincial GDP and per capita
GDP data are from China Statistical Yearbooks (NBS 2001, 2011). Unlike those
of many Western democratic economies, China’s provincial capitals usually are also
the economic centers of their respective provinces. To this end, the following
terms are used to express China’s interprovincial geographical proximity: “distance
between capitals” and “interprovincial adjacency”. Distance between capitals is rep-
resented by the distance (in kilometers) between two provinces’ capitals via
national railway. The data on distance between capitals are calculated by the
author based on the data released by the Ministry of Railways of the People’s
Republic of China.
In this paper, a comprehensive method is used to construct interprovincial ethnic
linkages. Suppose that there are k ethnic groups in both provinces i and j. If the
ith and jth provinces’ population shares for the kth ethnic group are expressed by
xk (it ranges between 0 and 1) and yk (it ranges between 0 and 1), respectively, the
kth ethnic group’s linkage index between provinces i and j can be measured by the
following formula:
ETHNICijk ¼ min xk ;yk
 
; where xk∈ 0; 1ð Þ and yk∈ 0; 1ð Þ: ð5Þ
In Eq. (5), min (•) denotes the minimization of the variables within parentheses.
The data on the population shares (xk and yk) are calculated by the author based
on the data released by the Fifth and Sixth National Population Census of the
People’s Republic of China (conducted at 0:00 a.m. on November 1 of 2000 and
2010, respectively).
Since there are 56 ethnic groups in China, the overall ethnic linkage between prov-
inces i and j can be measured by the following formula:
ETHNIC56ij ¼ ETHNICij1 þ ETHNICij2 þ… þ ETHNICij56
¼
X56
k¼1 min xk ;yk
  ð6Þ
In Equation (6), min (•) denotes the minimization of the variables within parentheses.
For all k, xk∈(0, 1), yk∈(0, 1), and ∑xk = ∑yk = 1. Consequently, ETHNIC56ij ranges
between 0 and 1. In the extreme cases, when ETHNIC56ij =1, provinces i and j have a
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common ethnic structure (i.e., for all k, xk = yk); when ETHNIC56ij =0, the two prov-
inces do not have any ethnic linkage with each other (i.e., for all k, xk (or yk) = 0). In
other words, greater values of ETHNIC56ij indicate greater degrees of ethnic linkages
between the two provinces. This formula has been used in Guo (2004; 2009, p. 89) and
Noland (2005). 10
A brief statistical description of selected variables included in Eqs. (1), (2), and
(3) is given in Table 2 (for 2000) and Table 3 (for 2010). The largest numbers of
observations (i.e., interprovincial samples) are 465 for both 2000 and 2010. How-
ever, because the data on interprovincial trade are unavailable for the two prov-
inces of Hainan and Tibet (including 59 province pairs) from 2000 as well as for
13 province pairs (i.e., Beijing-Hainan, Guizhou-Tibet, Hainan-Heilongjiang,
Hainan-Jilin, Hainan-Liaoning, Hainan-Ningxia, Hainan-Shanghai, Hainan-Tianjin,
Hainan-Tibet, Hainan-Xinjiang, Jilin-Tibet, Ningxia-Tibet, and Tibet-Yunnan) from
2010, the total numbers of observations that can be actually used for our regres-
sions are reduced to 406 (i.e., 465−59 = 406) for 2000 and 452 (i.e., 465−13 = 452)
for 2010 accordingly.
Results and discussion
The gravity models constructed in “Methods” section can be tested by using the data
described in “The data” section. We first run Eq. (1) by using both the data of 2000 and
2010 (the estimated results are shown in the second and third columns of Table 4,
respectively) and the pooled data (the estimated results are shown in Table 5 in
which the year-fixed effects on trade are also included in regression shown in the
third column).
Early comparative studies, using the international panel data of China and East
Asia, show that geographical influence on international trade was reduced from the
1980s to 1990s (Guo 2007; 2013, p. 210). One of the major driving forces contrib-
uting to this tendency might be technological advance in transportation and com-
munications. Intuitively, wide application of E-commerce and the declining of
distance-related transactions costs have increasingly contributed to the growth of
international trade. However, in this paper, the negative effect of “distance” on
interprovincial trade is found to rise from 2000 to 2010. Obviously, this does not
reflect China’s improvement of transport infrastructures; neither does it conform to
the general pattern of international trade. The main cause of China’s interprovincial
trade barriers may be the market-segmenting behavior that the Chinese provinces
carry on in order to maintain social stability and maximize fiscal incomes (Poncet
2005). Undoubtedly, our finding shows a sign of China’s spatial economic disinte-
gration during the first decade of the twenty-first century.
The estimated coefficients on “ADJACENT”, which are statistically significant,
slightly increase from 2000 to 2010 (see Table 4). However, the year-fixed effect derived
from the regression based on the pooled data (see the third column of Table 5) does
not show any statistical significance for this kind of increase.
The estimated coefficients on “ETHNIC56” are statistically significant for 2000
and 2010. However, they are negative, suggesting that the interprovincial links of
56 ethnic groups as a whole have only but impeded China’s interprovincial eco-
nomic activities. Obviously, this provides no evidence that supports the widely
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the data on selected variables, 2000
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean SD
ln(TRADEij) 406 2.99573 11.59910 6.84499 1.36932
ln(GDPiGDPj) 465 5.73532 13.62832 10.70744 1.43231
ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj) 465 16.19674 20.00507 17.70224 0.69716
ln(DISTANCEij) 465 4.91998 8.75037 7.47203 0.64053
ETHNIC56ij 465 0.06160 0.99930 0.75563 0.24827
k = 1. Bai 465 0.00001 0.00532 0.00004 0.00028
k = 2. Blang 465 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000
k = 3. Buyi 465 0.00001 0.00129 0.00005 0.00008
k = 4. Dai 465 0.00000 0.00008 0.00000 0.00001
k = 5. Daur 465 0.00000 0.00120 0.00001 0.00006
k = 6. Dong 465 0.00001 0.01331 0.00011 0.00077
k = 7. Dongxiang 465 0.00000 0.00303 0.00001 0.00015
k = 8. Gelao 465 0.00000 0.00009 0.00001 0.00001
k = 9. Han 465 0.06061 0.99682 0.74690 0.25065
k = 10. Hani 465 0.00000 0.00003 0.00001 0.00001
k = 11. Hui 465 0.00025 0.15621 0.00371 0.00904
k = 12. Jingpo 465 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000
k = 13. Kazak 465 0.00000 0.00012 0.00000 0.00001
k = 14. Kirgiz 465 0.00000 0.00004 0.00000 0.00000
k = 15. Korean 465 0.00002 0.01072 0.00013 0.00064
k = 16. Lahu 465 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000
k = 17. Li 465 0.00000 0.00159 0.00001 0.00007
k = 18. Lisu 465 0.00000 0.00023 0.00000 0.00001
k = 19. Manchu 465 0.00006 0.03705 0.00118 0.00443
k = 20. Maonan 465 0.00000 0.00089 0.00000 0.00004
k = 21. Miao 465 0.00004 0.03037 0.00069 0.00280
k = 22. Mongol 465 0.00008 0.01789 0.00064 0.00164
k = 23. Mulao 465 0.00000 0.00081 0.00000 0.00004
k = 24. Naxi 465 0.00000 0.00047 0.00000 0.00002
k = 25. Qiang 465 0.00000 0.00004 0.00000 0.00000
k = 26. Salar 465 0.00000 0.00047 0.00000 0.00003
k = 27. She 465 0.00000 0.00372 0.00004 0.00024
k = 28. Shui 465 0.00000 0.00035 0.00001 0.00003
k = 29. Tibetan 465 0.00002 0.22530 0.00074 0.01057
k = 30. Tu 465 0.00000 0.00121 0.00002 0.00006
k = 31. Tujia 465 0.00003 0.04172 0.00066 0.00438
k = 32. Uygur 465 0.00002 0.00027 0.00004 0.00002
k = 33. Va 465 0.00000 0.00005 0.00000 0.00000
k = 34. Xibe 465 0.00000 0.00187 0.00001 0.00009
k = 35. Yao 465 0.00000 0.01114 0.00009 0.00064
k = 36. Yi 465 0.00002 0.02577 0.00022 0.00196
k = 37. Zhuang 465 0.00005 0.02701 0.00025 0.00142
Definitions of the variables shown in this table are given in the text
N number of observations, and SD standard deviation
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for the data on selected variables, 2010
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean SD
ln(TRADEij) 452 2.30259 12.62984 6.95446 1.76181
ln(GDPiGDPj) 465 8.83243 16.76316 13.75672 1.38476
ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj) 465 19.15152 22.40275 20.60043 0.62203
ln(DISTANCEij) 465 4.91998 8.75037 7.47203 0.64053
ETHNIC56ij 465 0.08280 0.99870 0.75979 0.24414
k = 1. Bai 465 0.00000 0.00526 0.00005 0.00027
k = 2. Blang 465 0.00000 0.00016 0.00000 0.00001
k = 3. Buyi 465 0.00001 0.00231 0.00007 0.00016
k = 4. Dai 465 0.00000 0.00011 0.00001 0.00002
k = 5. Daur 465 0.00000 0.00105 0.00001 0.00005
k = 6. Dong 465 0.00001 0.01301 0.00013 0.00076
k = 7. Dongxiang 465 0.00000 0.00282 0.00002 0.00015
k = 8. Gelao 465 0.00000 0.00033 0.00001 0.00003
k = 9. Han 465 0.08176 0.99660 0.75070 0.24660
k = 10. Hani 465 0.00000 0.00014 0.00001 0.00001
k = 11. Hui 465 0.00020 0.14827 0.00356 0.00865
k = 12. Jingpo 465 0.00000 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000
k = 13. Kazak 465 0.00000 0.00071 0.00002 0.00004
k = 14. Kirgiz 465 0.00000 0.00089 0.00000 0.00004
k = 15. Korean 465 0.00001 0.00856 0.00013 0.00058
k = 16. Lahu 465 0.00000 0.00003 0.00000 0.00000
k = 17. Li 465 0.00001 0.00396 0.00003 0.00018
k = 18. Lisu 465 0.00000 0.00026 0.00001 0.00001
k = 19. Manchu 465 0.00011 0.03156 0.00111 0.00378
k = 20. Maonan 465 0.00000 0.00080 0.00000 0.00004
k = 21. Miao 465 0.00005 0.03136 0.00088 0.00296
k = 22. Mongol 465 0.00005 0.01774 0.00056 0.00157
k = 23. Mulao 465 0.00000 0.00073 0.00001 0.00003
k = 24. Naxi 465 0.00000 0.00038 0.00000 0.00002
k = 25. Qiang 465 0.00000 0.00005 0.00001 0.00001
k = 26. Salar 465 0.00000 0.00053 0.00001 0.00003
k = 27. She 465 0.00000 0.00306 0.00004 0.00021
k = 28. Shui 465 0.00000 0.00029 0.00001 0.00003
k = 29. Tibetan 465 0.00002 0.24438 0.00080 0.01149
k = 30. Tu 465 0.00000 0.00120 0.00003 0.00007
k = 31. Tujia 465 0.00006 0.04210 0.00079 0.00438
k = 32. Uygur 465 0.00001 0.00036 0.00004 0.00003
k = 33. Va 465 0.00000 0.00006 0.00001 0.00001
k = 34. Xibe 465 0.00000 0.00158 0.00001 0.00008
k = 35. Yao 465 0.00001 0.01086 0.00011 0.00064
k = 36. Yi 465 0.00002 0.03288 0.00027 0.00220
k = 37. Zhuang 465 0.00005 0.02644 0.00031 0.00141
Definitions of the variables shown in this table are given in the text
N number of observations, and SD standard deviation
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recognizable view that ethnic linkage index tends to encourage trade between prov-
inces that are multiethnically linked. In fact, since the partial correlation between
the natural log of TRADE and the ETHNIC56 scores yields an inverted-U shape
curve for 2010 (see Fig. 1), the above estimated coefficients on ETHNIC56 may be
misleading (at least for 2010).
Let us now run Eq. (2) constructed in the “Methods” section. In China’s Fifth National
Population Census conducted in November 2000, only permanent populations were
counted (whereas in 2010, those who had stayed at their current residences for
Table 4 Basic regressions—56 ethnic groups as a single variable, 2000 and 2010
Explanatory variable Coefficient in 2000 Coefficient in 2010
Constant 14.461a (1.462) 29.057a (2.447)
ln(GDPiGDPj) 0.647
a (0.046) 0.759a (0.063)
ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj) −0.253
a (0.072) −1.041a (0.108)
ln(DISTANCEij) −1.212
a (0.097) −1.377a (0.127)
ADJACENTij 0.504
a (0.149) 0.579a (0.196)
ETHNIC56ij −1.560
a (0.324) −1.393a (0.367)
PD −0.350a (0.099) −0.521a (0.134)
Coefficient of correlation (R2) 0.644 0.586
Standard error of regression 0.823 1.141
F statistic 120.556 104.786
Sig. of regression 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 405 451
Dependent variable is the natural log of interprovincial trade. Figures within parentheses are standard errors. The variance
inflation factors (VIFs) are all less than 2.5, which are not reported in the table
“a”Denotes statistically significant at greater than the 1 % level
Table 5 Regressions based on pooled data—56 ethnic groups as a single variable
Explanatory variable Coefficient (excl. year-fixed effects) Coefficient (incl. year-fixed effects)
Constant 30.733a (1.840) 30.764a (1.839)
ln(GDPiGDPj) 0.865
a (0.047) 0.862a (0.047)
ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj) −1.131
a (0.081) −1.129a (0.081)
ln(DISTANCEij) −1.486
a (0.095) −1.450a (0.097)
ln(DISTANCEij) in 2010 – −0.064
b (0.031)
ADJACENTij 0.429
a (0.148) 0.466a (0.190)
ADJACENTij in 2010 – −0.065 (0.236)
ETHNIC56ij −1.694
a (0.274) −1.939a (0.313)
ETHNIC56ij in 2010 – 0.487
c (0.298)
PD −0.587a (0.102) −0.587a (0.101)
Coefficient of correlation (R2) 0.598 0.600
Standard error of regression 1.229 1.228
F statistic 225.620 151.267
Sig. of regression 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 856 856
Dependent variable is the natural log of interprovincial trade. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) are all less than 2.5,
which are not reported in the table. Figures within parentheses are standard errors
“a”, “b”, and “c”Denote statistically significant at greater than the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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6 months or longer were also counted). This could affect the final estimated co-
efficients in 2000 (remember that the “floating” populations may sometimes play
more important roles in interprovincial marketing and trade than in permanent
residents). To this end, we will not use the pooled data of 2000 and 2010; in-
stead, we will only run regressions based on the data of 2000 and 2010, respect-
ively. The estimated results shown in Table 6 are derived by excluding the
variables whose variance inflation factors (VIFs) exceed 10 (a value that is often
regarded as indicating multicollinearity). These results, compared with those
shown in Tables 4 and 5, can help us to better explain the diverse ethnic influ-
ences on interprovincial trade:
 As for 2000, seven ethnic groups (Jingpo, Gelao, Manchu, Hui, Dongxiang, Daur,
and Maonan) have positive effects; four ethnic groups (Han, Li, Hani, and Buyi)
have negative effects on interprovincial trade; and 26 ethnic variables (Bai, Blang,
Dai, Dong, Kazak, Kirgiz, Korean, Lahu, Lisu, Miao, Mongol, Mulao, Naxi, Qiang,
Fig. 1 Partial correlations between trade and ethnic linkage, 2000 and 2010. Sources: Table 6 for the estimated
coefficients (2010) and Appendix for ethnic population
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Table 6 The estimated coefficients on the ethnic variables defined in Eq. (2)
Explanatory variable 2000 2010
Coefficient Standard error Coefficient Standard error
1. Bai −192.637 341.756
2. Blang −11,4466.708 83,123.810 −36,909.300b 17,153.46
3. Buyi −1989.870c 1044.715 767.807 753.124
4. Dai −17,883.500 14,948.590 −16,349.312a 5046.068
5. Daur 1432.134b 656.009 2586.816a 951.629
6. Dong 48.212 69.223 68.102 91.598
7. Dongxiang 1284.739a 488.076 1515.314a 433.379
8. Gelao 27,798.940a 9578.905 −4593.947 4339.398
9. Han −1.350a 0.319 −1.421a 0.359
10. Hani −24,297.300b 11,902.110 −1843.340 8839.561
11. Hui 10.359b 4.765 13.374b 6.508
12. Jingpo 245,643.800a 75461.210 60,181.957a 33170.5
13. Kazak −9719.600 11,494.670 −10010.414a 3264.211
14. Kirgiz −17,486.600 19,645.340 5896.574b 2606.726
15. Korean −44.290 70.080 −91.085 103.646
16. Lahu 1913.425 34,644.910 69,627.249a 27,110.080
17. Li −25132.900a 9002.619 −249.689 262.76
18. Lisu 8126.747 6308.788 7117.415 7282.878
19. Manchu 52.555a 11.183 48.142a 17.541
20. Maonan 2042.121c 1088.550 4115.362b 1693.773
21. Miao 2.001 23.957 −7.926 34.356
22. Mongol 35.200 26.217 132.086a 36.313
23. Mulao
24. Naxi −2385.250 8354.333
25. Qiang 4665.429 16,645.120 35,288.611a 12,540.510
26. Salar
27. She 58.482 152.286 452.580c 245.120
28. Shui −4178.755 2932.771
29. Tibetan 45.738 35.168 9.441b 4.825
30. Tu −415.235 1047.778 3469.553c 2133.557
30. Tujia −8.852 11.024 −8.700 14.283
31. Uygur 1081.944 2407.569 1386.841 1977.202
32. Va 12,915.170 13,274.480 −42,682.902a 11,427.990
33. Xibe −65.376 411.421 −194.667 660.486
34. Yao 21.566 75.760 80.423 101.235
35. Yi 9.209 36.782 −4.697 40.519
36. Zhuang 45.252 33.230 98.107b 42.746
Coefficient of correlation (R2) 0.745 0.645
Standard error of regression 0.725 1.095
F statistic 29.877 20.337
Sig. of regression 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 405 451
Only the coefficients on ethnic variables are included in this table. The ethnic variables whose variance inflation factors
(VIFs) are larger than 10 are omitted from regressions
“a”, “b”, and “c”Denote statistically significant at greater than the 1, 5, and 10 % levels, respectively
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Salar, She, Shui, Tibetan, Tu, Tujia, Uygur, Va, Xibe, Yao, Yi, and Zhuang) are
not found to have any significant influences on trade.
 As for 2010, 14 ethnic groups (Lahu, Qiang, Jingpo, Tu, Mongol, Manchu, Hui,
Zhuang, Dongxiang, Daur, Kirgiz, She, Maonan, and Tibetan) have positive effects
on interprovincial trade; five ethnic groups (Han, Va, Kazak, Dai, and Blang) have
negative effects; and 18 ethnic variables (Bai, Buyi, Dong, Gelao, Hani, Korean, Li,
Lisu, Miao, Mulao, Naxi, Salar, Shui, Tujia, Uygur, Xibe, Yao, and Yi) are not found
to have any significant influences on trade.
Remember that there is a negative relationship between China’s interprovincial ethnic
links and trade, which can be witnessed by the negative coefficients on ETHNIC56 in
Tables 4 and 5. Then why there are fewer ethnic groups with negative influences on
interprovincial trade than those with positive influences? This may plausibly stem from
the very fact that the Han majority whose estimated coefficients are negative for both
2000 and 2010 (see Table 6) has a much larger weight than any other ethnic minorities.
Using the estimated coefficients reported in Table 6, one may calculate each ethnic
group’s contribution to interprovincial trade (the results are reported in Table 7). Here,
take the Hui ethnic group as an example. As shown in Table 3, the minimum, max-
imum, and mean values of interprovincial ethnic links—represented by ETHNICij11 in
Eq. (2)—are 0.00020 (i.e., the one for Jiangxi and Zhejiang), 0.14827 (i.e., the one for
Ningxia and Qinghai), and 0.00356, respectively, in 2010. Given that the estimated
coefficient on ETHNICij11 is 13.374 (shown in Table 6), the Hui’s contribution to inter-
provincial trade in 2010 ranges from 0.268 (that is, exp(0.00020 × 13.374) × 100–100)
percent to 626.423 (that is, exp(0.14827 × 13.374) × 100–100) percent, with the mean
value being 4.876 (that is, exp(0.00356 × 13.374) × 100–100) percent.
It must be noted that the estimated coefficients on some important ethnic minori-
ties—such as Miao, Tibet, Uygur, Xibe, Yao, Yi and Zhuang—are statistically insignifi-
cant in either 2000 or 2010 (see Table 6). Technically, if an ethnic group is not found
to exert any significant influences on China’s interprovincial trade, it may have, subject
to different economic conditions, both positive and negative effects on the trade of
different groups of provinces. In order to test this kind of non-linear effects, let us run
Eq. (3). Since, as mentioned earlier, the quality of 2000's ethnic data is less reliable than
that of 2010's, we only test the regression by using 2010's data. Unfortunately, we can-
not derive more encouraging results (the estimated coefficients are not reported here).
Nevertheless, we do find that some ethnic groups (such as the Hui, the Mancu, the
Mongol, and the Zhuang) have some non-linear influences on interprovincial trade.
Specifically, the above regression yields not only positive coefficients on these ethnic
minorities (i.e., βk > 0) but also a negative coefficient (i.e., α4 < 0) on the interaction of
ETHNIC56 and the income levels of trading partners (measured by the natural log of
their per capita GDPs). However, since the threshold value—i.e., ln(GDPPCiGDPPCj)
*
k
defined in Eq. (4)—is extremely large, the fundamental changes of these ethnic groups’
positive effects on interprovincial trade will not occur in the near future.
Conclusions
During the past decades, along with the gradual reform in the decentralization of
authority (that is, transferring economic management and decision making from the
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central government to provincial and local governments), China’s interprovincial rela-
tions have been transformed accordingly. Naturally, the examination of the driving
forces to the causes and consequences of interprovincial economic (dis)integration in
Table 7 Quantifying the ethnic groups’ contributions to interprovincial trade (%)
Ethnic group 2000 2010
Minimum value Maximum value Mean value Minimum value Maximum value Mean value
1. Bai
2. Blang 0.000 −99.734 −2.643
3. Buyi −2.057 −98.996 −12.583
4. Dai −3.191 −83.380 −18.414
5. Daur 0.085 350.646 1.170 0.154 1417.056 2.123
6. Dong
7. Dongxiang 0.047 3668.286 2.256 0.056 7127.996 2.666
8. Gelao 6.748 882,465.122 51.102
9. Han −10.450 −73.957 −63.703 −10.968 −75.736 −65.587
10. Hani −6.241 −96.533 −22.619
11. Hui 0.207 364.588 3.762 0.268 626.423 4.876
12. Jingpo 0.000 6032.297 53.249 0.000 174.133 11.025
13. Kazak −4.219 −99.922 −22.057
14. Kirgiz 0.035 19,224.296 1.813
15. Korean
16. Lahu 2.019 737.508 28.358
17. Li −19.574 −10.000 −57.647
18. Lisu
19. Manchu 0.584 425.169 5.992 0.535 356.895 5.475
20. Maonan 0.027 412.995 0.697 0.054 2598.034 1.410
21. Miao
22. Mongol 0.626 941.393 7.657
23. Mulao
24. Naxi
25. Qiang 3.181 425.512 28.270
26. Salar
27. She 0.096 298.641 1.680
28. Shui
29. Tibetan 0.015 904.629 0.759
30. Tu 0.919 6409.243 10.314
30. Tujia
31. Uygur




36. Zhuang 0.531 1238.236 3.037
Figures in each row, which are calculated based on Tables 2 and 6, represent percentages by which provinces that are
linked by the left-side ethnic group would increase (or decrease if the figures are negative) bilateral trade as opposed to
those that are not linked by the same ethnic group. Blank denotes unavailability since either the ethnic variables are
omitted from the regressions or the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant in Table 6
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China is an important taskforce not only to the economists but also to the policy-
makers who have concerns about their internal spatial economic efficiencies.
It has been found that ethnic Chinese (mainly encompassing the Han ethnic Chinese)
networks play an important role in international trade. Rauch and Trindade (2002),
for example, find that ethnic Chinese networks have a quantitatively important
impact on bilateral trade through the mechanisms of market information and
matching and referral services, in addition to their effect through community en-
forcement of sanctions that deter opportunistic behavior. Their estimated results
show that for trade between countries with ethnic Chinese population shares at
the levels prevailing in Southeast Asia, the smallest estimated average increase in
bilateral trade in differentiated products attributable to ethnic Chinese networks is
nearly 60 %.11
However, in this paper, we have not found any evidence that supports that the Han
majority has played positive roles in China’s interprovincial trade. Although it seems
that more in-depth investigation is still needed, we believe that our small and negative
coefficients on the Han (see Table 6) stem from the very fact that the Han majority
accounts for more than 90 % of China’s total population (more than 1.3 billion). A large
population per se also implies a great degree of diversity or dissimilarity of its members
(Alesina and Spolaore 1997, p. 1029). As a result, a common standard cannot be fully
realized among different provinces’ Han people in China.
To develop this argument further, let us assume that China’s domestic trade can
be divided into interprovincial and intra-provincial trade, on the one hand, and in-
terethnic and intra-ethnic trade, on the other hand. Obviously, according to the
cost of transactions, intra-provincial trade is always preferable to interprovincial
trade and intra-ethnic trade is preferable to interethnic trade. Therefore, ceteris
paribus, the intra-provincial and intra-ethnic trade is always more profitable than
the interprovincial and interethnic trade. If the population of an ethnic group is
very small, then the intra-provincial and intra-ethnic trade is not able meet the de-
mand of economic growth. As a result, the interprovincial and intra-ethnic and
intra-provincial and interethnic trade may still be needed. In this case, the inter-
provincial and intra-ethnic trade is preferable to the intra-provincial and intereth-
nic trade if the interprovincial transactions cost is lower than interethnic
transactions cost, and vice versa. Figure 2, in which smaller ethnic groups have
greater (in both positive and negative directions) effects on interprovincial trade,
has provided evidence that small ethnic groups are always more important in pro-
moting interprovincial trade than large ethnic groups.
We need to clarify the inherent forces and narratives behind the differing influ-
ences of all the ethnic minorities on China’s spatial economic (dis)integration. For
example, the Han-Uyghur unrest in and outside Xinjiang would have been respon-
sible for the Uyghurs’ insignificant effects on interprovincial trade; and Tibetans’
positive influences on interprovincial trade in 2010 has benefited from the
Qinghai–Tibet railway which went into operation in 2006. With the operation of
the Qinghai–Tibet railway, the costs of transportation of both passengers and
goods should be greatly reduced, allowing for an increase in volume—the costs per
ton-kilometer will be reduced from 0.38 yuan to 0.12 yuan (Cnradio, 10 November
2006). As a result, more commodities will be carried to and from Tibet by the
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railway. However, it seems that I am not able to clarify all the influences of each
and all of China’s 56 ethnic groups in a single paper.
Since China adopted different approaches when conducting the population census in
2000 and 2010, our ethnic data may not be comparable from 2000 to 2010. Therefore,
cares should be taken when the changes of ethnic influences on interprovincial trade
from 2000 to 2010 are to be clarified. But our estimated coefficients for 2010 seem to
be more reliable than those for 2000 (shown in Table 6). If the 2010’s results shown in
Table 7 are correct, we may conclude that 14 ethnic groups (Lahu, Qiang, Jingpo, Tu,
Mongol, Manchu, Hui, Zhuang, Dongxiang, Daur, Kirgiz, She, Maonan, and Tibetan)
tend to contribute to China’s interprovincial trade, that five ethnic groups (Han, Va,
Kazak, Dai, and Blang) tend to retard China’s interprovincial trade. These findings will
be useful for policy makers to reappraise which of China’s ethnic groups are playing the
most (least) important roles in, and to introduce the optimal informal institutions into,
the promotion of interprovincial economic cooperation in China.
It must be noted that interprovincial trade may also foster the interprovincial migra-
tion of ethnic groups in China, raising an issue of potential endogeneity in the analysis
of ethnic influences on interprovincial trade in this paper. However, since our ethnic
data only include permanent populations and that most, if not all, seasonable, short-
stay migrants have only been officially defined as the “floating populations” (liudong
renkou), this kind of potential endogeneity problem does not render the estimated
results biased and inconsistent.
In order to overcome the problems with multicollinearity, we have omitted a
number of ethnic groups from our regressions. The general rule of thumb is that
variance inflation factor (endogeneity) exceeding 4 warrant further investigation,
while those exceeding 10 are signs of serious multicollinearity requiring correction
(Simon 2004). In weaker models, especially in those that are not supported by
Fig. 2 Ethnic influence on interprovincial trade decreases with the size of ethnic population
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large sets of data, VIF above 2.5 may also merit further investigation (Berry and
Feldman 1985, p. 49; Arceneaux and Huber 2007). In this paper, we have re-run
all the regressions in Table 6 by omitting the explanatory variables with VIF ex-
ceeding 4 (the estimated results are not reported here). But we have found that
the estimated results are quite stable after the variables with the VIF exceeding 10
are omitted from the regressions. Thus, even though the variables with VIF exceed-
ing 4 are included, the estimated coefficients reported in this paper are not
affected by multicollinearity.
Endnotes
1Calculated by author based on the data released by the World Trade Organization
(Available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm. Accessed
2013-5-20).
2Data sources: Rumbaugh and Blancher (2004) and WTO (2011).
3Note that Beijing and Shanghai’s reductions of domestic trade from 2000 to 2010 are
mainly due to their removals of large industrial, pollution-making plants during the
above period.
4For a more detailed analysis of the distance puzzle, see Head and Disdier (2008).
5These trade barriers take a number of forms including legal and institutional differ-
ences (Anderson and Marcouiller 2002; Linders et al. 2005; Combes et al. 2005; and
Guiso et al. 2006), ethnic/linguistic fractionalization (Rauch 2001; Rauch and Trindade
2002; Melitz 2008; and Felbermayr et al. 2010), and linguistic and religious dissimilar-
ities (Guo 2004; 2007).
6The earliest application of the gravity model can be traced back to the 1940s (see,
e.g., Zipf 1946; Stewart 1948). More recent summaries can be found in Baldwin and
Taglioni (2006) and Head and Mayer (2013).
7Since GDPPC equals GDP/POP (where POP is population), Eq. (1) can be written as
ln(TRADEij) = α0 + (α1 + α4)ln(GDPiGDPj) + α2lnDISTANCEij + α3ADJACENTij-
α4ln(POPiPOPj) + α5PD + βETHNIC56ij. However, we will not use this equation since
the inclusion of GDP and POP—unlike that of GDP and GDPPC—can easily result in
multicollinearity problems.
8A direct measure of transport costs (instead of distance) has been suggested as a
proxy for trade costs, especially for within-country studies (Combes et al. 2005). How-
ever, since we only consider the trade via national railways in our research and that the
per-kilometer costs of transportation via national railways are almost fixed throughout
China, these two measures are not different from each other.
9They are compiled by China Association of Communications and Transportation
and the National Development and Reform Commission of the PRC and published by
China Communications Yearbook Press in 2001 and 2011, respectively.
10Several other methods can also be used. Boisso and Ferrantino (1997), for example,
use ∑xkyk as the construct of similarity index. However, Eq. (6) can prevent the index
of interprovincial ethnic linkages from further reduction when the values of xk and yk
are small.
11More recently, there is an empirical work in which the Chinese network is found to
lead to a modest amount of trade creation of only about 15 % (Felbermayr et al. 2010).
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Appendix
Table 8 Names and demographic distributions of China’s 56 ethnic groups
Name Population (thousand persons) Five major host provinces
Achang* 39.56 Yunnan, Guangdong, Henan, Shandong, Jiangsu
Bai 1933.51 Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, Guangdong, Zhejiang
Baonan* 20.07 Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan
Blang 119.64 Yunnan, Guangdong, Shandong, Zhejiang, Chongqing
Buyi 2870.03 Guizhou, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Yunnan, Fujian
Dai 1261.31 Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shandong
Daur 131.99 Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Beijing, Liaoning
Deang* 20.56 Yunnan, Guangdong, Shandong, Zhejiang, Sichuan
Derung* 6.93 Yunnan, Guizhou, Henan, Guangdong, Sichuan
Dong 2879.97 Guizhou, Hunan, Guangxi, Zhejiang, Guangdong
Dongxiang 621.50 Gansu, Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, Guizhou
Ewenki* 30.88 Inner Mongolia, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Beijing, Shandong
Gaoshan* 4.01 Henan, Fujian, Guangxi, Liaoning, Hebei
Gelao 550.75 Guizhou, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan
Han 1,220,844.52 Guangdong, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Sichuan
Hani 1660.93 Yunnan, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Shanghai, Shandong
Hezhe* 5.35 Heilongjiang, Guangdong, Jilin, Beijing, Liaoning
Hui 10,586.09 Ningxia, Gansu, Xinjiang, Henan, Qinghai
Jing* 28.20 Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangdong, Jiangxi
Jingpo 147.83 Yunnan, Guangdong, Shandong, Guizhou, Jilin
Jino* 23.14 Yunnan, Sichuan, Chongqing, Guangdong, Jiangsu
Kazak 1462.59 Xinjiang, Henan, Guangdong, Gansu, Hunan
Kirgiz 186.71 Xinjiang, Tibet, Heilongjiang, Guangdong, Zhejiang
Korean 1830.93 Jilin, Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Shandong, Beijing
Lahu 485.97 Yunnan, Shandong, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu
Lhoba* 3.68 Tibet, Guizhou, Fujian, Beijing, Liaoning
Li 1463.06 Hainan, Guizhou, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Guangxi
Lisu 702.84 Yunnan, Sichuan, Hebei, Shandong, Guangdong
Manchu 10,387.96 Liaoning, Hebei, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia
Maonan 101.19 Guangxi, Guizhou, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Fujian
Miao 9426.01 Guizhou, Hunan, Yunnan, Chongqing, Guangxi
Monba* 10.56 Tibet, Jiangsu, Gansu, Jiangxi, Guangxi
Mongol 5981.84 Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Hebei, Xinjiang, Jilin
Mulam 216.26 Guangxi, Guizhou, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Hunan
Naxi 326.30 Yunnan, Sichuan, Tibet, Zhejiang, Beijing
Nu* 37.52 Yunnan, Hainan, Guangdong, Tibet, Shandong
Oroqen* 8.66 Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Beijing, Hebei
Pumi* 42.86 Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangdong, Shandong, Chongqing
Qiang 309.58 Sichuan, Guangdong, Guizhou, Zhejiang, Jiangsu
Russian* 15.39 Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Beijing, Heilongjiang, Shanghai
Salar 130.61 Qinghai, Gansu, Xinjiang, Shanghai, Guangdong
She 708.65 Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Guizhou, Guangdong
Shui 411.85 Guizhou, Guangxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Yunnan
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